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ABSTRACT 
Technology has increasingly been implemented in healthcare with the intention of 
reducing errors. One area where errors could be reduced is in the pharmaceutical 
environment, specifically dispensing errors. A qualitative observational study was 
conducted in a pharmaceutical environment to identify system vulnerabilities (SVs) and 
workarounds in the work system. This was done to assess how the implementation of a 
workflow management system (WFMS) impacts the work system and work practices and 
to identify opportunities for error reduction. The work system experienced changes in 
work practices and in the SVs following the implementation of the WFMS. Additionally, 
the WFMS prompted additional workarounds to occur following implementation. Certain 
risks were reduced by the WFMS, as shown by the elimination of certain SVs or 
reduction in the risk rating of other SVs. However, certain risks continued to exist and 
new risks were introduced as shown by the kinds of workarounds existing after 
implementation and the creation of new SVs.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Healthcare errors are costly both in terms of lives lost and monetary cost. The 
landmark 2000 report To Err is Human, is often cited to illustrate the high cost of 
medical errors. More recently, a study utilizing claims data estimated the annual cost of 
medical errors to be $19.5 billion in 2008 dollars (Shreve et al., 2010). Utilizing 
Medicare data from 2008, another study estimated that 180,000 Medicare beneficiaries 
alone experienced a medical error which contributed in some way to their death 
(Levinson & General, 2010). Medical errors often result in a patient experiencing an 
adverse outcome, often manifested as prolonged hospitalization, disability at the time of 
discharge, or death as a result of improper medical care as opposed to the natural 
progression of disease (Andel, Davidow, Hollander, & Moreno, 2012; Kohn, Corrigan, & 
Donaldson, 2000; Levinson & General, 2010). 
Medication errors represent the largest subset of medical errors (accounting for 
about 19% of medical errors) (Leape et al., 1991). A medication error is an error that 
occurs anywhere along the medication process from the nurse or doctor ordering the 
medication to dispensing the medication to administering and monitoring the medication 
(Gandhi et al., 2005). One study found that 28% of medication errors were preventable. 
Of the preventable medication errors, 42% were life-threatening or serious medication 
errors (Bates et al., 1995). Another study found that the majority of medication errors 
involved medications that were administered via intravenous routes (Ross, Wallace, & 
Paton, 2000). These types of errors are most often either severe or moderate errors (Taxis 
& Barber, 2003). 
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Dispensing errors are a subset of medication errors that occur during the 
preparation of the dose order. The literature has defined dispensing errors to include 
medications that are different from the medication ordered such as the wrong drug or 
wrong strength (Guernsey et al., 1983; Rolland, 2004) as well as deviations from standard 
pharmacy policy (Cina et al., 2006), mislabeling, missed doses, and doses filled at 
incorrect times (Rolland, 2004). One study examining errors in concentration of 
intravenous drugs found that a third of doses contained incorrect concentrations of the 
medication (Parshuram et al., 2008). Concentration errors are prone to occur for pediatric 
patients as their dose preparation typically involves more calculations and dilution of 
stocks than for adult patients (Kaushal et al., 2001). Dose errors in pediatric medications 
errors are especially problematic as pediatric patients are more vulnerable and have the 
potential for higher harm should there be a dosing error (Kaushal et al., 2001). Compared 
with the other stages of the process (e.g., ordering, administering, monitoring) the least 
number of medication errors occur in the dispensing process (Bates et al., 1995; Nebeker, 
Hoffman, Weir, Bennett, & Hurdle, 2005). However, studies have found that unprevented 
dispensing errors occur in between 0.06 to 18% (James et al., 2009) of doses which 
indicatdes that there is an opportunity to reduce errors within the dispensing process.    
Implementing technology is one way to address safety and other concerns in a 
variety of domains including healthcare, manufacturing and transportation. 
Unfortunately, the implementation of technology can sometimes have unexpected 
adverse effects which negatively impact safety (Ash, Berg, & Coiera, 2004; Eslami, Abu-
Hanna, de Keizer, & de Jonge, 2006; Karsh, Weinger, Abbott, & Wears, 2010; Koppel et 
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al., 2005; Nebeker et al., 2005; Shen & Neyens, 2014). Consequently, it is important that 
the technology be evaluated and understood both before and after implementation. 
Various technologies, including computer provider order entry (CPOE) systems (Bates et 
al., 1998; Eslami et al., 2006; Koppel et al., 2005), bar coding medication administration 
(BCMA) (So, 2012), and electronic health or medical record (EHR or EMR) systems 
(Nebeker et al., 2005) have been evaluated as ways to reduce medication errors (Ash et 
al., 2004; Gandhi et al., 2005; Karsh et al., 2010). However, the majority of the research 
has focused on the prescription process (e.g., orders for medication administration) 
(Grossman, Cross, Boukus, & Cohen, 2012; Koppel et al., 2005; Magrabi, Li, Day, & 
Coiera, 2010) or the drug administration process rather than the dispensing process 
(Rothschild et al., 2005). Consequently, there is the opportunity for more investigation on 
to improve safety in the dispensing process.  
A workflow management system (WFMS) is a type of technology that can be 
utilized in the dispensing process to potentially reduce errors and improve patient safety. 
In general, a WFMS should support the work processes performed by an organization. 
WFMS have been implemented in a variety of domains, including healthcare (Halsted & 
Froehle, 2008). Because WFMS are designed to interact with the current work system, it 
is important to understand the actions and activities that comprise the actual work system 
and processes. There is often a discrepancy between the way actions are intended to be 
completed and the way actions are actually completed – such that, the intended work 
system differs slightly from the actual work system. An example of this is a workaround, 
which occurs when a user executes an action different than the system intended as a 
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result of something blocking the intended path to execution (Koopman & Hoffman, 
2003). The term block will be used in this study to describe the process, event, or system 
characteristics that blocks the intended path. However, other terminology has been used 
to describe the same blocking mechanism including gaps (Cook, Render, & Woods, 
2000), problems (Holden, Rivera-Rodriguez, Faye, Scanlon, & Karsh, 2013), challenges 
(McAlearney et al., 2007), operational failures (Tucker & Spear, 2006), and barriers 
(Holden, 2011). The blocking mechanism can range from a system failure, such as not 
recognizing a necessary input, to an intentional avoidance of a system due to perceptions 
that the system is not trustworthy or difficult to use. Another example of a possible block 
includes situations where the system or technology does not match the work practices in 
such a way that there is a benefit for the user to interact with the technology or system 
(Vogelsmeier, Halbesleben, & Scott-Cawiezell, 2008). The workarounds occur in 
reaction to the blocks. Sometimes the workaround can bridge gaps that exist in the work 
systems and prevent errors by anticipating and reacting to these gaps (Cook et al., 2000). 
Other times workarounds can lead to negative consequences including potential errors.  
Workarounds may themselves foster system vulnerabilities. Likewise, system 
vulnerabilities, such as those resulting from a poorly designed system, may encourage 
workarounds. For this study, a system vulnerability (SV) is defined as an undesirable 
situation or outcome that is created by the interaction of a user, technology, system, or 
process factor, that can lead to a patient safety event or the potential for a patient safety 
event (e.g., a precursor). This definition draws on the SV definition used by Yang et al. 
(2014) of “activities or events that have the potential to risk a patient’s safety, increase 
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cost and waste, or reduce efficiency of the workflow.” SVs and workarounds can be 
precursors or manifestations of unintended negative consequences such as decrements in 
patient safety. Identifying SVs in a work system pre- and post- technology 
implementation can be a powerful way to examine the success of a system in terms of the 
incorporation of the technology into the work system or the adaptation of the work 
system to the technology. Evaluating SVs can function as a robust tool to investigate 
workarounds and other aspects which impact how a technology is best implemented in a 
system. 
A user’s trust in the technology can play an important role in how a user interacts 
with a technology or system (Lee & See, 2004) and consequently influences the existence 
of both SVs and workarounds. When a user’s trust in a technology and its capabilities are 
mismatched with the technology’s actual capabilities, misuse or disuse occurs (Lee & 
See, 2004). Misuse occurs when a user’s expectations of the technology’s capabilities are 
higher than reality and the user over relies on the technology. A consequence of 
technology misuse includes complacency. For example, users may rely on the technology 
to notify them of any issue rather than simultaneously monitoring other sources of 
information (Parasuraman & Wickens, 2008). Disuse is the opposite of misuse, and 
results when a user underutilizes the technology as a result of underestimating the 
technology’s capabilities (Lee & See, 2004). When a user disuses a technology, a 
workaround may result in which the user bypasses the technology in favor of performing 
an action without the assistance of the technology. When this occurs some of the positive 
benefits of the system, such as error catching, may be eradicated. SVs may impact the 
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level of trust a user has in a technology. For example, if a technology is producing 
excessive and incorrect alerts or alarms the user may disuse the technology and ignore an 
alert (Parasuraman & Wickens, 2008). 
When looking at a work system, artifacts may be examined to learn more about 
the work practices and how the work system is designed and implemented. An artifact is 
something that is used or created “in the course of doing work” (Beyer & Holtzblatt, 
1998). If a waiter writes down the customer’s order on a notepad and then enters the 
order into a computer that relays the order to the kitchen, he creates the physical artifact: 
the piece of paper with the order. This is then transformed into a digital artifact: the 
electronic computer order. Artifacts contain information (Beyer & Holtzblatt, 1998). 
Through the user’s interaction with the artifact, the artifact gains information about the 
user and how the user works. For example, how the order is written on the notepad can 
give insight into the waiter and his or her work practices. The artifact also may contain 
information that the user may utilize. For example, a computer may prompt the waiter to 
select a cook temperature for steak which transfers the information that steaks can be 
cooked at different temperatures.  
In order to properly and successfully implement a technology into a work system 
it is important to have a comprehensive understanding of the work practices and how the 
users actually operate within the work system. A system can be qualitatively investigated 
by examining the workarounds and SVs in order to develop a more robust understanding 
of the system. Therefore, the goal of this research is to determine the impact of the 
implementation of a WFMS had on work practices and a work system. This will be done 
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by identifying SVs in both the pre- and post-implementation work systems and 
identifying workarounds that users have done as a result of the implementation of the 
work system. 
This section presented the foundation and literature related to the research 
conducted in this thesis. This review sets the stage for understanding how the complexity 
in work domains impacts the technology design and implementation. In the following 
chapter, the methodology used to conduct an observational study examining the impact of 
a WFMS on a pharmaceutical work system will be detailed.  
Research Objective 
 The objective of this study is to evaluate the impact of a WFMS on work practices 
and a work system by identifying and rating pre- and post-implementation SVs, 
identifying workarounds that users engage in as a result of the implementation of the 
work system, and qualitatively examining how these SVs and workarounds could impact 
patient safety. 
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CHAPTER 2. METHODOLOGY 
 The previous chapter provided the background necessary for understanding this 
research by discussing the importance of improving safety through reducing errors in 
healthcare settings and the role technology plays. This chapter will outline the 
methodology used to evaluate the technology’s impact on a pharmaceutical work system 
through the identification and examinations of SVs and workarounds. First an overview 
of the work system and environment will be given followed by a description of the 
methodology used to complete an analysis – work model creation, system vulnerability 
identification and analysis, and block/workaround identification and analysis. 
Observations 
In total, 50 hours of observations were completed at several inpatient pharmacies 
associated with hospitals within a 700 bed academic medical center in the Southeastern 
United States. The study was approved by both the Institutional Review Boards at the 
Medical University of South Carolina and Clemson University (IRB# Pro00039896). 
Observations were conducted post-WFMS implementation during both day and night 
shifts. Observations involved shadowing pharmacy employees including pharmacists, 
pharmacy technicians, and students/trainees as they completed tasks associated with IV 
medication preparation. This included compounding the IV medication doses in the clean 
room, preparing the IV medication doses that could be filled with pre-made IV bags (and 
consequently completed outside the clean room), verifying that these doses were prepared 
correctly, and sorting the doses to be delivered to the specific unit or floor for 
administration to the patients. Compounding was primarily performed by the pharmacy 
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technicians, whereas dose verification was exclusively performed by pharmacists. Both 
pharmacy technicians and pharmacists completed the sorting process.   
In addition to shadowing the employees, employees were also asked clarifying 
and probing questions through informal conversation between tasks. Probing questions 
were used to determine the work practices pre-WFMS implementation, to determine the 
intended pre- and post-WFMS implementation work practices and for clarification related 
to any non-standard work process observed. This was done informally to ensure that the 
participants feel at ease and comfortable discussing their true work practices. (Barriball & 
While, 1994)  
Observations and conversation were noted on paper and the notes were 
transcribed immediately following each observation session. Each observation session 
was limited to two-hour periods to minimize the impact on work productivity, to ensure 
the observer notes were complete, and to facilitate clarifications with the staff if needed. 
During the transcriptions, additional clarifying and explanatory notes were added. These 
were clearly marked as post-observation notes. Once the intended work process (as 
intended by the technology, policies and procedures in use) was determined, observed 
system vulnerabilities and workarounds were noted. Actions and situations that 
constituted a workaround or system vulnerability were determined based on knowledge 
of the intended process, comments by workers and, when applicable, discussions with 
domain experts. 
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Pharmacies 
Three 24 hour inpatient pharmacies were observed. Each pharmacy serviced a 
separate hospital: a children’s hospital, a general hospital that handles a variety of 
patients and a hospital that specializes in digestive health and heart and vascular care. 
The pharmacies were similar in the number of IV prescriptions prepared daily but were 
different in terms of the workplace culture, layout, work policies and practices, and 
employee experience with both job tasks and with the pharmacy technology. 
Additionally, there were some differences observed between the pharmacies in terms of 
the specific doses and concentrations created due to the differences in the patient 
population (especially comparing the children’s hospital with the adult hospitals). 
Observing multiple pharmacies was crucial to developing a holistic understanding of the 
dose preparation process both with and without the assistance of the specific pharmacy 
technology. This assisted in developing a comprehensive understanding of the work 
system changes in the context of system vulnerabilities and workarounds present in the 
dose preparation process both with and without the existence of the WFMS. 
 
Workflow Management System 
The technology that was implemented in the pharmacies is a WFMS with built in 
safety features to prevent potential medication preparation errors. Orders for the doses are 
received and assigned to the appropriate workstation (e.g., clean room, pre-made dose 
station, verification station, sorting station) as they move through the preparation process. 
Users at each workstation were able to digitally organize the doses and easily monitor 
their workload. The technology featured a graphical user interface (GUI) which walked 
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pharmacy technicians through the steps for preparing each dose.  As the pharmacy 
technician was preparing the dose, the technology required them to take pictures of their 
preparation process at each step. These images were then used by the pharmacist to verify 
that the dose had been properly prepared. Prior to the technology’s implementation, all 
items used to complete the dose (e.g., syringes, medication vials) were placed in a basket 
and the pharmacist used these physical artifacts to verify that the dose had been properly 
prepared. The technology relied heavily on barcode scanning for tracking and error 
prevention. Patient-dose barcode-based labels were printed when a dose preparation 
process was initiated and were scanned in conjunction with the manufacturers’ barcodes 
on the dose ingredients. When the preparation process was completed the same patient-
dose barcode was scanned to move the dose to the queue for verification. To verify that 
the dose had been properly prepared, the pharmacist viewed the digital images that had 
been taken during the dose preparation process. Once the dose was digitally verified by 
the pharmacist, the sorting process could begin. The sorting process involved scanning 
the patient-dose barcode which triggered the system to automatically print a new label 
with two barcodes. One barcode facilitated tracking the dose’s location from within the 
WFMS. The other barcode was for documenting medication administration in a different 
software that was used throughout the entire hospitals by nurses, doctors and other 
medical staff.   
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Work System Analysis 
The work system was analyzed through the creation of work models, the coding 
of the observation transcriptions, and user ratings. Work models, such as information 
flow diagrams, were created to visualize and more fully comprehend the work system. To 
better understand the work system and dissect the work system into meaningful parts, the 
observation transcriptions were coded separately for system vulnerabilities (SVs) and 
workarounds. The Coding Analysis Toolkit (CAT), a web-based, open source coding 
software, was used for coding both the system vulnerabilities (SVs) and the workarounds. 
Finally, users of the system participated in a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), 
a method commonly used in a variety of fields to quantitatively analyze failure within a 
system, to rate the identified SVs.  
 
Work Model Creation 
Work models were created to illustrate the information flow and the step by step 
work process for both the pre- and post-WFMS implementation work systems. The 
information flow work models provided a visualization of how the information moves 
between entities in the work system and how this movement changed following the 
implementation of the WFMS. Work process model gave the step by step process for 
both the dose preparation and dose verification process. How each step was completed in 
the pre- and post-WFMS implementation work system was laid out side by side for an 
easy comparison. Additionally, having this side by side comparison allowed for an easy 
visualization of how certain steps were added or changed following the implementation 
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of the WFMS. Following the identification of the SVs, stars representing SVs were laid 
on the work process model to illustrate where each SV could occur in the process. The 
completed work process model was confirmed to accurately represent the dose 
preparation process by a subject matter expert familiar with working in the process.  
  
System Vulnerability (SV) Coding 
The Coding Analysis Toolkit (CAT) software was utilized to code specific text 
snippets from the observations transcripts that pertained to SVs observed or described in 
the conversations, as well as precursors to SVs identified during observation. The 300 
identified text snippets were then condensed using common characteristics. This was 
done by assigning each text snipped one or more common characteristic, such as 
“interruptions” or “quantity mismatch.” The text snippets were then examined in groups 
determined by their assigned common characteristics. Text snippets discussing the same 
SV were reduced and a meaningful list of 21 SVs was created. It was determined whether 
the SV could occur in the pre-WFMS implementation work system, the post-WFMS 
implementation work system, or both. A brief description of how each SV manifests 
itself in the work system was created. The step(s) of the process during which the SV 
could occur was determined. Stars representing each SV were placed in the appropriate 
locations of the work process model which had been previously created.  
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Failure Modes and Effects Analysis of System Vulnerabilities  
A failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) was done to assess the risks 
presented by each SV and determine what effect the implementation of the WFMS had 
on the risk. A FMEA is a tool for preemptively assessing the risk that exists in a system 
(Childers & Neyens, 2014). A typical FMEA involves stakeholders rating potential 
failure modes in three standard areas – probability of occurrence (i.e., likelihood), 
severity of effect (i.e., impact on safety), and ease of detection (Childers & Neyens, 
2014). For this FMEA the stakeholders were determined to be the pharmacists and 
pharmacy technicians who used the WFMS and SVs were used as potential failure 
modes.  
Users across all shifts from all three pharmacies were asked to individually rate 
each SV both pre- and post-WFMS implementation on a 5 point Likert scale in the three 
standard areas – likelihood (extremely unlikely (1) – extremely likely (5)), impact on 
safety (not at all (1) to always (5)), and ease of detection (very difficult (1) to very easy 
(5)). A 5 point Likert scale was used as it is commonly used in health care settings 
(Childers & Neyens, 2014). SVs that were determined to only exist in the pre- or post-
WFMS implementation work system were only rated in the work system in which they 
existed. Participants only rated SVs pre-WFMS implementation if they had experience 
working in that work system. Ratings were collected from a total of 33 participants over 
the course of one day. The ease of detection ratings were reversed so that a lower rating 
indicated less of a risk (i.e., very easy (1) to very difficult (5)). Following the reversal of 
the ease of detection ratings, mean ratings were determined for each category for each 
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pre- and post-WFMS implementation SV. For each SV in each work system, the mean 
ratings were then multiplied to determine a risk priority number (RPN) which represents 
the overall perceived risk the SV poses to the system. Because a 5 point Likert scale was 
used the RPN had the potential of ranging from 1 (minimum risk) to 125 (maximum 
risk). The higher the RPN was the more risk that SV presented to the system. Likewise, a 
lower RPN represents less risk to a system.  
 
Workaround Coding 
 The observation transcript coding for workarounds was done by utilizing CAT to 
code text snippets from the observations transcripts and then condensing these text 
snippets utilizing common characteristics. These text snippets included those that 
discussed both workarounds and the blocks that created or encouraged workarounds. The 
categorization of the condensed list of workarounds and blocks was different from the 
categorization of the SVs. However, it is important to note that some SVs functioned as 
blocks. In order to properly categorizing workarounds and blocks, a model was 
developed (see Figure 1). This model provided a visualization of the interaction of three 
aspects – policy and procedure, technology, and work practices – that could motivate the 
existence of a block and be involved in the resulting workaround. Workarounds and 
blocks were to one of the 7 sections of Figure 1 depending on what combination of the 
three aspects played into the block’s existence or were incorporated in the resultant 
workaround.  
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Figure 1. Block and workaround categorization with sections identified numerically 
 
The three circles within the Venn diagram represented the three aspects that could 
motivate the existence of a block and be involved in the resulting workaround - policies 
and procedures, technology, and work practices. Policy and procedures represented the 
rules and how the work was intended to be done – the intended work practice or the 
standard work practices. Technology was primarily the WFMS although it could also 
include the label printer in the pre-WFMS implementation work system and any other 
technology encountered. Work practices were how the tasks were actually completed 
which may differ by user and may not match the intended work process. Each block or 
workaround was assigned to one of the seven sections contained in the three overlapping 
circles. For blocks, the assignment was based on which aspect(s) (i.e., policy and 
procedure, technology, and/or work practices) the caused the block to exist. For example, 
if the limitations of technology forced the user to go outside the standard work practice 
but policy and procedure and actual work practices did not interfere with the path to 
completing the action then that block was assigned to section 7. For workarounds, the 
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assignment was based on which aspect(s) were included in the workaround. For example, 
if the workaround incorporated technology and actual work practices but did not follow 
the policy and procedures then it would be assigned to the section 4.  
In this chapter the methodology developed and used in this research was 
discussed. The following chapter will give the results found utilizing this methodology to 
evaluate the impact the implementation of a WFMS had on a pharmaceutical work 
system.  
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CHAPTER 3. RESULTS 
 The previous chapter discussed the methodology developed and used to find the 
results that will be discussed in this chapter. In this chapter the results will be broken 
down into three sections – general findings, results relating to SVs, and results relating to 
workarounds.  
Overview 
 The implementation of the WFMS fundamentally changed aspects of the work 
system. While the fundamental goal of creating i.v. compounding medications safely and 
efficiently remained the same, both the intended work process for achieving this goal and 
the actual work process different users took changed. As can be seen in Figure 2, more 
steps are required to prepare a dose in the post-WFMS implementation work system. 
However, verification can begin earlier in the post-WFMS implementation work system. 
Also, the way each step is completed for the preparation and verification process varies 
between the pre- and post-WFMS implementation work systems, as seen in Figures 2 and 
3. A list of the SVs noted in Figures 2 and 3 can be found in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. 
With the implementation of the WFMS several artifacts that were previously 
physical became electronic. For example, pre-implementation the dose order was 
represented and signaled by the physical artifact of a label. Post-implementation the dose 
order was represented and signaled electronically in the WFMS. Another example is the 
artifacts used to verify that the dose has been properly prepared. Pre-implementation the 
physical artifacts used to create the dose are used by the pharmacist. However, post-
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implementation it is not the physical artifacts that the pharmacist uses but rather pictures 
of the tools used to create the dose order – the electronic representations of these artifacts. 
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Table 1. System vulnerability descriptions and manifestations in pre-implementation 
work system 
 Key Pre-Dose Edge 
T
im
in
g
 o
f 
P
re
p
ar
at
io
n
 
Have to wait on reconstitution to 
dissolve to prepare other dose 1 
Delay in dose preparation possible if reconstitution not prepared in 
advance due to it being unclear which ones are needed. 
Dose prepared early 
2 Dose expires before administered or order is cancelled after dose is 
prepared 
Dose prepared late 
3 Dose label could be stored improperly/misplaced and prepared later 
than intended  
V
er
if
ie
d
 a
s 
co
rr
ec
t 
b
u
t 
er
ro
r 
in
 p
re
p
ar
at
io
n
 
Previously verified reconstitution 
actually has error in preparation process 4 If already verified there is no way to re-examine preparation process 
Ingredient used but not documented as 
used (for verification) 5 
Pharmacy technician forgets to put vial in basket after using 
ingredient 
Dose is prepared differently than is 
conveyed to the pharmacist 6 
Syringe pulled back to incorrect location, ingredient not put in 
basket and used (or vice-versa) 
Different quantity of drug is used than is 
documented (for verification) 7 
Pharmacy technician could pull syringe back to different quantity 
than used, or if two or more ingredients were used it could be 
unclear which syringe corresponds with which ingredient 
W
ai
ti
n
g
 o
n
 
v
er
if
ic
at
io
n
 
Delay in when pharmacist can begin 
verification 8 
Verification requires physical dose so pharmacist must wait until 
pharmacy technician places basket in pass through window 
Crowded pass through window 
9 If multiple dose baskets and small pass-through window could run 
out of space or cause baskets to be misplaced  
Verification is a bottleneck 
10 
Doses pile up waiting to be verified during busy times  
E
rr
o
r 
m
ad
e 
in
 d
o
se
 p
re
p
ar
at
io
n
 
Pharmacy technician does not know 
how to properly complete preparation 
process 
11 Pharmacy Technician relies primarily on knowledge in the head to 
prepare dose 
Incorrect ingredient used 
12 Ingredients are verified as correct by pharmacist during verification. 
If incorrect ingredient used, it results in waste. 
Label is not used or is filled out with 
incorrect or missing information 13 
Pharmacy Technician could forget to or intentionally not update 
label  
Dose order lost 
14 Label could be lost or misplaced and pharmacy would only be 
notified after dose is not on the floor when needed 
Calculation error in amount of 
ingredient to use 15 
Calculations are done by pharmacy technicians but verified by 
pharmacist after the preparation of dose is complete 
Ingredient used expires before dose is to 
be administered 16 
Pharmacist visually verifies expiration date but it may not be salient 
if expiration date is before dose due date 
W
o
rk
 
P
ro
ce
ss
 
F
lo
w
 
Pharmacy Technician or Pharmacist 
may be interrupted 17 
Worker may duplicate action or forget where in the process they are 
when interrupted 
Pharmacy Technician must wait for 
necessary ingredient to be returned by 
verifying pharmacist 
18 If ingredient is in a multi-use vial, then pharmacy technician must 
either wait for verification to be complete or open a new vial 
In
v
en
to
ry
 
Is
su
es
 
How much ingredient is left in vial is 
unknown 19 
Pharmacy technician who previously used multi-use vial may not 
record or incorrectly record quantity remaining in vial 
Unable to locate dose once delivered to 
floor 20 No proof that dose had been delivered or record of where dose is in 
system 
Technology 
Issues 
Excessive and inconsistent warning 21 
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Table 2. System vulnerability descriptions and manifestations in post-implement work 
system 
 Key Post-WFMS 
T
im
in
g
 o
f 
P
re
p
ar
at
io
n
 
Have to wait on reconstitution to 
dissolve to prepare other dose 1 
Organization of the WFMS queue increases salience of upcoming dose 
orders but pharmacy technician must still be aware of which dose orders 
require slow dissolving reconstitutions. 
Dose prepared early 
2 
The WFMS waits until close to due date to put dose orders with short 
expiration periods in the queue. However, some doses still could be 
cancelled after preparation if prepared too early  
Dose prepared late 
3 Organization of the WFMS queue minimizes late preparation of dose but 
excessive orders in queue could obscure dose order.  
V
er
if
ie
d
 a
s 
co
rr
ec
t 
b
u
t 
er
ro
r 
in
 p
re
p
ar
at
io
n
 
Previously verified reconstitution 
actually has error in preparation process 4 
Pharmacist can examine images that were used to initially verify but images 
may be not represent all aspects of the preparation process  
Ingredient used but not documented as 
used (for verification) 5 
The WFMS requires ingredient to be scanned but pharmacy technician could 
forget to capture image of all ingredients used.  
Dose is prepared differently than is 
conveyed to the pharmacist 6 
Photograph misrepresents dose preparation (e.g., not all syringes/vials 
included in picture). Ingredients not all scanned. 
Different quantity of drug is used than is 
documented (for verification) 7 
The WFMS requires picture of syringe with ingredient in it. However, the 
WFMS could be used differently than intended (e.g., take picture of empty, 
pulled back syringe) 
W
ai
ti
n
g
 o
n
 
v
er
if
ic
at
io
n
 
Delay in when pharmacist can begin 
verification 8  
Crowded pass through window 
9 Pass-through window could still be crowded with doses but not needing to 
pass artifacts means there is more space 
Verification is a bottleneck 
10 
 
E
rr
o
r 
m
ad
e 
in
 d
o
se
 p
re
p
ar
at
io
n
 
Pharmacy technician does not know how 
to properly complete preparation process 11 
Low level of detail of instruction or instructions in different order than how 
completed in real world could cause confusion to novice users 
Incorrect ingredient used 
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Label is not used or is filled out with 
incorrect or missing information 13  
Dose order lost 
14 
 
Calculation error in amount of ingredient 
to use 15  
Ingredient used expires before dose is to 
be administered 16 
Pharmacist visually verifies expiration date and the WFMS does not allow 
ingredient made in house to be used if it expires soon 
W
o
rk
 
P
ro
ce
ss
 
F
lo
w
 
Pharmacy Technician or Pharmacist may 
be interrupted 17 
The WFMS reminds worker what has been completed but some information 
may need to be recalled. Process is still vulnerable to interruptions. 
Pharmacy Technician must wait for 
necessary ingredient to be returned by 
verifying pharmacist 
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In
v
en
to
ry
 
Is
su
es
 
How much ingredient is left in vial is 
unknown 19 
When more than one multi-use vial used in preparing a dose then which vial 
is considered only partially used by the system is unclear 
Unable to locate dose once delivered to 
floor 20 
 
Technology 
Issues 
Excessive and inconsistent warning 21 
Predictable warnings (i.e., asking to reprint time med labels) mean that other 
important warnings could be ignored. Inconsistent warnings (i.e., do not 
shake not always on unshakeable labels) make warnings lose reliability 
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IV Dose Preparation
1. Initial 
verification
2. Dose orders received
3. Dose orders 
organized
4. Preparation process 
initiated in WFMS
5. Ingredients collected
6. Ingredients entered
7. Instructions 
Displayed
9. Ingredients recorded
10. Ingredients 
measured
11. Quantity of 
ingredients recorded
12. Ingredients added 
to diluent
13. Dose labelled
14. Completed dose 
recorded
16. Dose prepared to 
leave clean room
17. Dose leaves clean 
room
8. Ingredients prepared
15. Dose signaled as 
complete
Post-WFMS
Order verified by the pharmacist
Labels organized by pharmacy technician
Pharmacy technician retrieves necessary ingredients and 
supplies
Pharmacy technician prepares 
ingredients that require 
additional preparation
Tech removes drug from vial with syringe
Pharmacy technician injects drug into diluent bag
Order verified by the pharmacist
Order received by WFMS
Order routed to destination pharmacy workstation
Order to fill selected by Pharmacy technician
Label prints and WFMS shows ingredients needed on screen
Pharmacy technician retrieves necessary ingredients 
and supplies
Pharmacy technician scans ingredients into WFMS via ingredient barcode
Once all correct ingredients are 
scanned, WFMS displays 
instructions on dose preparation.
WFMS provides preparation 
instructions for any ingredients 
requiring additional preparation
Ingredients NOT 
in final state
Image(s) are captured of ingredient label showing 
expiration date and lot number
An image of the full syringe and used vial is captured
Drug and diluent placed in basket for 
preparation with label
Ingredients in 
final state
Pharmacy technician 
prepares ingredients that 
require additional 
preparation
Following WFMS instructions pharmacy technician removes drug 
from vial with syringe
Empty syringe is pulled back to quantity 
which full syringe contained
Empty and pulled back syringe, and 
drug vial are placed in basket
Pharmacy technician injects drug into diluent bag
Label is placed on completed doseLabel is placed on completed dose
Completed and labelled dose is placed in 
basket with empty syringes and used vials
Image captured of complete labelled dose, all 
ingredients and tools used to create the dose
Basket placed in pass through 
window for verification
Completed and labelled dose is placed in basket
Basket placed in pass through window
Dose label scanned to signify preparation is complete 
and ready for verification 
Ingredients NOT in final state
14
16
Batch of labels print on regular interval
 
Urgent labels print immediately
Batch of dose orders received on regular interval
 
Urgent dose orders received immediately
Ingredients and 
supplies placed in 
basket
13
1,       4,  
          19
15
  7
17
Pre-WFMS
5
21
Ingredients in 
final state
2, 3
Verification can 
begin
Verification can 
begin
12, 
18
8
9
11
Legend
               Task                Action completed for all dose orders            Leads to next action                  System Vulnerability
               Task only existing post-WFMS                Action completed for only certain dose orders           Leads to possible next action
#
 
Figure 2. Dose Preparation pre- and post-implementation 
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Pharmacist Verification
1. Dose 
Received
2. Dose 
selected
3. Dose 
preparation 
reviewed
4. Dose 
accepted/
reworked/
rejected
5. Dose issue 
communicated
6. Dose routed
7. Corrections 
made
Post-WFMS
Pharmacist retrieves basket from pass through window
Pharmacist reviews items contained in basket (pulled back syringes and used 
vials) to ensure dose properly prepared
Dose order received and appears in 
pharmacist verification queue
(Step 14 in preparation process)
Pharmacist selects dose to verify
Pharmacist reviews images taken during dose 
preparation to ensure dose properly prepared
Pharmacist accepts 
dose
Pharmacist 
rejects dose
Pharmacist accepts dose 
and initials label
Pharmacist rejects dose
Dose placed in 
proper unit bin to be 
delivered
Dose discarded. 
Dose placed in pass through window by pharmacy technician
(Step 17 in Preparation process)
Dose routed 
to sorting 
queue
Pharmacist notes in 
dose order record 
reason for rejection
Physical dose 
located and 
discarded
Pharmacist verbally 
communicates issue with 
dose preparation to 
pharmacy technician
10
Pharmacist requests 
rework for dose
Pharmacist verbally 
communicates issue with 
dose preparation to 
pharmacy technician
Dose and basket 
placed in pass 
through window. 
Pharmacist requests 
rework for dose
Pharmacist puts note in 
dose order record stating 
reason for rework
Dose order routed 
to rework queue. 
Pharmacy technician 
Pharmacy Technician corrects issue 
with drug and passes dose and basket 
back to pharmacist.
New label printed and 
preparation process 
begins again.
Pharmacy Technician corrects 
issue with drug and adds pictures 
of correction to dose order record. 
System creates new dose 
order and preparation 
process begins again.
6
20
Pre-WFMS
Legend
               Task                Action completed for all dose orders            Leads to next action                  System Vulnerability
               Task only existing post-WFMS                Action completed for only certain dose orders           Leads to possible next action
#
 
Figure 3. Verification process pre- and post-implementation 
 
Another key difference between the pre- and post-WFMS implementation work 
system is the manner in which information is transmitted through the work system. As 
seen in Figure 4, much of the information pre-WFMS implementation was transmitted 
from and through the dose order label and the information flow through other entities in 
the process followed a generally linear pattern.  In the post-WFMS implementation work 
system the information flow centers around the WFMS which is represented by the 
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dotted box on Figure 5 and contains the entities of the dose order information and drug 
information. Unlike the pre-WFMS implementation work system, information tends to 
follow a loop formation here and flow in both directions between the WFMS and other 
entities in the information flow diagram. Part of this transition involved the movement of 
artifacts from the physical to the electronic.  
With these changes in the work process, artifacts, and information flow, the SVs 
in the work system changed as well as the blocks and workarounds following the 
implementation of the WFMS.  
 
Order Dose Order 
Label prints Pharmacy 
Technician
PharmacistPrepare Dose
Dose 
Preparation 
Artifacts
Pharmacist 
verifies
Dose 
delivered to 
floor
Pre-Workflow 
Management System
Package 
Insert
Legend
                      External Entitites          Data Store Processes                    
      
Dose Order 
Label
 Figure 4. Pre-implementation information flow 
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Post-Workflow 
Management System
Pharmacist
Pharmacy 
Technician
Drug 
Information
Prepare Dose
Order
Verify Dose
Dose Order 
Information
Pharmacy 
Technician/
Pharmacist
Sort Dose
Dose out for 
delivery
..
Legend
                      External Entity            Data Store               Processes                     Inside the WFMS       
 
Figure 5. Post-implementation information flow 
 
System Vulnerabilities 
 A number of pre- and post- implementation system vulnerabilities (SVs) were 
identified. Certain SVs were eliminated with the implementation of the WFMS and exist 
only in the pre-implementation work system. Certain SVs were created by the 
implementation of the WFMS and exist only in the post-implementation work system. 
Most SVs identified exist in both pre- and post-implementation work systems but were 
affected by the implementation of the WFMS. The list of SVs, and how they manifest 
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themselves in both the pre- and post-implementation work system, can be found in Table 
1.  
 Some SVs, such as the pharmacy technician or pharmacist being interrupted, can 
occur anywhere in the dose preparation process. Other SVs, such as the pharmacy 
technician not knowing how to properly complete the dose preparation process, only 
impact certain steps of the dose preparation process. Different SVs can only occur during 
one particular step in the dose preparation process, such as an ingredient that expires 
prior to dose administration being used. The pre- and post-implementation dose 
preparation process, along with visualizations of where in the process the SVs can occur, 
can be found in Figure 1. Similarly, the dose verification process – where the pharmacist 
verifies that the dose has been properly prepared based on the artifacts provided by the 
pharmacy technicians – along with representations of applicable SVs can be found in 
Figure 2. Again certain SVs, such as the verification process being a bottleneck, apply to 
the entire verification process. Other SVs, such as the dose being prepared differently 
than is conveyed to the pharmacist by the artifacts, only apply to a single step of the 
verification process. One SV, that the dose cannot be located once delivered to the floor, 
is only applicable following the dose verification process. In both Figures 2 and 3, SVs 
that can occur in both the pre- and post-implementation work system are indicated by 
stars spanning both columns. SVs that can occur in only the pre-implementation or post-
implementation work systems are indicated by a star in only one column.  
 As shown in Table 2, all SVs that continued to exist following the implementation 
of the WFMS were found to have a lower risk priority number following the 
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implementation of the WFMS. In other words, the risk the SV posed to the work system, 
either through the likelihood of occurrence, impact on safety, ease of detection or some 
combination of these, was lessened. Once the SVs had been identified, users ranked each 
of them in three categories used in an FMEA – likelihood of occurrence, impact of safety 
and ease of detection. The ratings in each of these categories were multiplied to 
determine a risk priority number (RPN) for each pre- and post- implementation SV. 
Based on the rating scale, RPNs could potentially range between 1 and 125 with the 
higher the RPN the greater risk the SV poses to the system. The highest rated SV, with an 
RPN of 43.51, was doses being unable to be located once delivered to the floor. This SV 
was eliminated with the implementation of the WFMS and consequently does not have a 
post-implementation RPN. The amount the RPN was reduced with the implementation of 
the WFMS varied. The percent change, shown in the right most column of Table 3, 
shows how the RPN reduction varied between SVs. The SV with the greatest reduction in 
RPN (27.8 points) was the dose being prepared differently than conveyed to the 
pharmacist. This SV had a percent change of -68.47%. The SV of the pass through 
window being crowded experienced the smallest drop in RPN (2.52 points) which was 
also illustrated in its lower percent change of 14.47%. All SVs that existed pre- and post-
implementation experienced a drop in the PRN (and across all three categories that make 
up the RPN) following the implementation of the WFMS and consequently all percent 
changes were negative. 
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Table 3. FMEA results (higher values indicate higher risk) 
      
  Key 
Likelihood (L) 
Safety Impact 
(S) 
Ease of 
Detection (D) 
Risk Priority Number 
(L*S*D) 
Pre- Post- Pre- Post- Pre- Post- Pre- Post- % change 
T
im
in
g
 o
f 
P
re
p
ar
at
io
n
 
Have to wait on reconstitution 
to dissolve to prepare other 
dose 
1 3.75 3.50 3.17 2.5 1.91 1.62 22.74 14.15 -37.77% 
Dose prepared early 
2 3.63 3.27 2.54 2.24 2.33 1.73 21.51 12.65 -41.19% 
Dose prepared late 
3 3.04 2.72 3.88
 
3.24 2.25 1.76 26.54 15.49 -41.64% 
V
er
if
ie
d
 a
s 
co
rr
ec
t 
b
u
t 
er
ro
r 
in
 
p
re
p
ar
at
io
n
 
Previously verified 
reconstitution actually has error 
in preparation process 
4 2.83 2.06 4.38 4.09 3.30 1.94 40.96 16.36 -60.06% 
Ingredient used but not 
documented as used (for 
verification) 
5 2.54 1.85 4.21 3.70 3.33 1.91 35.64 13.09 -63.27% 
Dose is prepared differently 
than is conveyed to the 
pharmacist 
6 2.74 1.88 4.26 3.56 3.48 1.91 40.60 12.80 -68.47% 
Different quantity of drug is 
used than is documented (for 
verification) 
7 2.74 1.88 4.30 3.94 3.22 2.03 37.91 15.03 -60.35% 
W
ai
ti
n
g
 o
n
 
v
er
if
ic
at
io
n
 
Delay in when pharmacist can 
begin verification 8 3.50 - 3.79 - 1.96 - 25.98 - - 
Crowded pass through window 
9 3.63 3.53 3.29 3.12 1.46 1.35 17.42 14.90 -14.47% 
Verification is a bottleneck 
10 3.63 - 3.57 - 1.83 - 23.66 - - 
E
rr
o
r 
m
ad
e 
in
 d
o
se
 p
re
p
ar
at
io
n
 
Pharmacy technician does not 
know how to properly complete 
preparation process 
11 2.58 2.09 4.04 3.88 1.96 1.62 20.41 13.12 -35.72% 
Incorrect ingredient used 
12 2.88 - 4.33 - 2.25 - 28.06 - - 
Label is not used or is filled out 
with incorrect or missing 
information 
13 2.46 - 4.25 - 1.96 - 20.47 - - 
Dose order lost 
14 3.13 - 4.38 - 2.67 - 36.56 - - 
Calculation error in amount of 
ingredient to use 15 2.91 - 4.38 - 2.46 - 31.33 - - 
Ingredient used expires before 
dose is to be administered 16 3.00 2.24 4.29 3.79 2.79 1.94 35.93 16.46 -54.19% 
W
o
rk
 P
ro
ce
ss
 
F
lo
w
 
Pharmacy Technician or 
Pharmacist may be interrupted 17 4.04 3.62 4.08 3.97 1.96 1.53 32.28 21.98 -31.91% 
Pharmacy Technician must wait 
for necessary ingredient to be 
returned by verifying 
pharmacist 
18 3.25 - 3.58 - 1.92 - 22.30 - - 
In
v
en
to
ry
 
Is
su
es
 
How much ingredient is left in 
vial is unknown 19 3.42 2.59 2.75 2.27 2.29 2.03 21.55 11.93 -44.64% 
Unable to locate dose once 
delivered to floor 20 4.00 - 4.17 - 2.61 - 43.51 - - 
Tech. 
Issues 
Excessive and inconsistent 
warning 
21 - 2.53 - 2.82 - 2.26 - 16.16 - 
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Workarounds 
 A number of pre- and post-implementation blocks and workarounds were 
identified through observation and confirmed with a subject matter expert. An illustration 
of how a block and its subsequent workaround works can be found in Figure 6. The 
workaround is illustrated by the dashed arrow and the solid arrow that go around the 
block. The dashed arrow illustrates a workaround that is outside the norm but still 
considered an acceptable work process. This usually occurs when a work system has been 
set up to anticipate certain blocks and has a standard procedure for working around them. 
The solid arrow is a larger deviation from the standard procedure and may move outside 
of what is an acceptable or anticipated work process. The aspects which impacted the 
existence of the blocks – policy and procedures, technology and/or work practices – were 
identified and blocks were assigned as belonging to a region of Figure 1 which can be 
found in the methodology section. Similarly, the aspects that each workaround 
incorporated – policy and procedures, technology and/or work practices – were also 
identified and workarounds were classified into one of the regions shown in Figure 1. 
Most blocks were identified as motivating one or more workarounds.  
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B
lo
ck
Task 2Task 1 Task 3 Task 4
Within pre-defined work process (Level 1)
Outside pre-defined work processes (Level 2)
Figure 6. Workarounds and blocks 
 
The majority of blocks were determined to be a category 7 block meaning they 
fall into section 7, technology, of the diagram. This indicates that most blocks standing in 
the way of carrying out the work practices as intended were the result of technology. 
Several blocks motivated by the existence of technology include issues with scanning. A 
couple examples of these sorts of blocks include the barcode on a diluent bag being 
scratched and therefore not scanning or the WFMS not recognizing a scanned ingredient. 
Another block motivated by technology is the WFMS recording a different quantity of 
ingredient remaining in a vial than is actually remaining, which is also a SV.  
The majority of workarounds were categorized as belonging to category 4 of the 
diagram meaning that they incorporated technology and work practices. Most category 4 
workarounds were prompted by blocks categorized as category 7. In fact, the category 7 
block and category 4 workaround was the most common block/workaround pair. For 
example, when the product bag does not scan due to the barcode being scratched two 
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category 4 workarounds were determined. The first is scanning another product bag and 
then using either the scanned bag or the bag that did not scan. Alternatively, it was 
observed that certain product bags failed to scan on such a consistent basis that a 
“scanning bag” had been established – that is a bag of product was marked “for scanning 
only” and was used to scan whenever that product was needed. In addition to the 
previously mentioned category 7 block of a WFMS recording a different quantity of 
ingredient remaining in a vial than is actually remaining, two category 4 workarounds 
were determined. One, used when the WFMS thinks there is less ingredient remaining 
than is actually there, is to scan an additional vial but only use the initial vial. When 
dealing with a reconstituted dose, the pharmacy technician could reconstitute more of that 
ingredient and do the same thing (i.e., scan the additional reconstituted vial but not use 
it).  
When the WFMS thinks there is more ingredient remaining than is actually there, 
also a category 7 block, there are two response workarounds, both categorized as a 
category 5 workaround. Category 5, which incorporates actual work practices but not the 
technology or policy and procedures, is a common categorization for workarounds. 
Workarounds classified as category 5 form the second largest group.. This makes sense 
since workarounds reflect actual work practices that fall outside of standard work 
practices. Several category 5 workarounds involve the user working outside of the 
technology rather than incorporating the technology into the task. For example, bag and 
vial system doses (e.g., diluent bags that connect to a powdered ingredient vial) being 
made prior to receiving orders for these doses and other doses (primarily insulin) being 
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made prior to interacting with the WFMS. Other related examples of category 5 
workarounds include drawing the ingredient into the syringe prior to scanning the 
ingredient vial and taking pictures of pulled back syringes (rather than syringes full of the 
ingredient to be injected into the diluent bag).  
Category 2 is another common category for workarounds. Category 2 involves 
workarounds that incorporate both actual work practices as policy and procedure but do 
not incorporate technology. As such, category 2 often involves bypassing the WFMS. 
Bypassing the WFMS is a built in workaround for users to utilize when it is not possible 
to incorporate the WFMS. Blocks that may motivate a user to formally bypass the WFMS 
include a correct ingredient not scanning due to a new manufacturer’s barcode or the 
ingredient not having been added to the WFMS yet. Unlike when users do not use the 
WFMS as intended by creating the dose prior to interacting with the system, there is a 
formal bypass procedure that follows policy and procedures. In situations where it is not 
possible to scan an ingredient, the user may, within the WFMS, select an option to 
bypass. This prompts the system to print labels for the dose and allow the user to create 
the dose without interacting with the system (e.g., pictures of the dose preparation 
process are not made). As such, the built-in workaround of bypassing incorporates both 
the work practices and policy and procedures.  
While it may initially appear that category 1 would not encompass any 
workarounds since it incorporates the three things – technology, work practices, and 
policy and procedures – there are a few workarounds that fall in this category. No 
workarounds were classified as category 3, 6 or 7. One example of a category 1 
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workaround is again in response to the WFMS not recognizing a scanned ingredient. If 
the dose is not urgent, the user can submit the unrecognized ingredient to a list of 
ingredients to be added and wait for the ingredient to be added which usually takes no 
more than a couple hours. Once the ingredient is added, the dose can be prepared as 
usual. Because this follows an established protocol it incorporates the policy and 
procedures. It is a process that users actually complete and therefore incorporates work 
practices. And finally, because it allows technology to be involved as intended, it 
incorporates technology. However, because it is a deviation from a standard work 
practice (e.g., the system works as intended and accepts the correct ingredient when 
scanned), it is a workaround. Similarly, if the scanner used to scan doses into their 
location on the floor loses connectivity and fails (a category 7 block), a user may neglect 
to use the scanner entirely (a category 5 workaround) or may restart the scanner in order 
to allow connectivity to be re-established. The latter is again a category 1 workaround 
because it incorporates policy and procedure (this is the established protocol for users to 
follow in situations when the scanner fails), incorporates actual work practices and leads 
to the technology being used as intended.  
Blocks, unlike the workarounds they motivate, fall into all 7 categories. Category 
7 blocks, which we have already discussed, are by far the most common category. 
Category 2 blocks, which include things such as an urgent dose being needed while in the 
middle of working on another dose and a pharmacist being unsure from the artifacts 
(physical or digital) given whether the dose was properly prepared, is the second most 
common block category. Fewer blocks were categorized into category 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6. 
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An example of a category 1 block is the perception that incorporating the WFMS into the 
insulin preparation process increases the preparation time. One category 3 block is a 
block intentionally built into the system – the WFMS does not allow two people to be in 
(e.g., working on) the same dose at the same time. This, when the system is used as 
intended, prevents duplicate doses from being created. Category 4 blocks, which are 
motivated by both technology and actual work practices but not policy and procedures, 
include not knowing which doses at the sorting station have been verified and not being 
able to see the quantity of insulin in the syringe with the cap on. A category 5 block, 
which is motivated solely by technology, is a picture missing from the digital dose 
artifacts sent to the verifying pharmacist. Blocks motivated solely by policy and 
procedures, which are category 6 blocks, include pharmacy technicians needing a label to 
order a controlled substance ingredient from the pharmacist and it being unclear what 
needs to be in each picture.  
This concludes the description of the results found in three main areas – general 
results, results specific to SVs and results specific to workarounds. The following chapter 
will discuss these results, what they mean, and how they fit into the research of others. 
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CHAPTER 4. DISCUSSION 
 The objective of this study is to investigate the impact that implementing a 
WFMS has on a work system, work practices, and subsequent patient safety. This was 
done by identifying SVs pre- and post-WFMS implementation and workarounds that 
users engage in as a result of the implementation of the WFMS and the blocks that create 
these workarounds. A key finding was that the risk, as indicated by the RPN, associated 
with SVs existing in both the pre- and post-implementation work system, decreased with 
the implementation of the WFMS. However, certain SVs were introduced as a result of 
the WFMS, indicating that a technology may simultaneously reduce risk in one area but 
introduce it in another area. This finding is supported by previous studies examining the 
impact of technology in healthcare which have found that the technology eliminates 
certain safety concerns while introducing unexpected new safety concerns (Ash et al., 
2004; Grossman et al., 2012; Karsh et al., 2010). 
 In regards to blocks and workarounds, it was found that the majority of blocks 
were identified as category 7 blocks, meaning that they were the result of technology. 
These blocks often resulted in workarounds which were identified as category 4 
workarounds meaning that they incorporated work practices and technology. Category 4 
was the most common category identified for workarounds. Following the 
implementation of a technology, in this case a WFMS, it follows that the new technology 
creates blocks for the users who are adapting to the new work system and new work 
practices. A study examining nurse’s work practices and workarounds following the 
implementation of a Bar Code Medication Administration (BCMA) Holden et al. (2013) 
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found that in some cases the technology blocked previous preferential problem-solving 
behaviors, resulting in the nurses needing to develop new work practices. Technology 
could motivate a block for a variety of reasons including the technology not 
accommodating actual work practices, the user having an inappropriate level of trust in 
the technology, and the technology requiring a change in work practices from the pre-
technology implementation work system. In the post-implementation work system, the 
use of technology is necessary to complete the dose preparation process, so it makes 
sense that most of the workarounds resulting from the technology blocks incorporate both 
work practices (i.e., how the work is actual done) and technology, albeit perhaps 
differently than intended.  
 Often actual work practices differ from the intended work practices. When 
changing a work system, such as by implementing a new technology, it is important to 
consider what actual work practices are and design the new work system to accommodate 
these actual work practices (as opposed to intended work practices). If a new work 
system is designed based on the intended work practices without consideration for the 
actual work practices (and why these differ), then it is possible that it may invite SVs and 
encourage workarounds since the system does not support the actual work practices. 
Relatedly, in the post-implementation work system, workarounds may result in actual 
work practices being different from intended work practices. This may happen if the 
technology does not support the way users have grown accustomed to doing work. For 
example, in the pre-implementation work system creating multiple doses of the same 
medication at a time, particularly doses such as insulin that only require drawing one 
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medication into a syringe, was common. However, if the WFMS has been set up to only 
create one dose at a time, this results in a workaround when pharmacy technicians are 
creating multiple insulin doses at a time and then interacting with the WFMS. The 
perception is that interacting with the WFMS while creating doses such as insulin slows 
down the dose preparation process. While almost all pharmacy technicians created insulin 
doses in this way, very few pharmacy technicians were observed preparing other types of 
doses prior to interacting with the system. The pharmacy technicians who did prepare 
doses independently of the WFMS may have done so as a result of their level of trust in 
the system.  
The user’s perception of the technology with which they interact impacts how 
they interact with the technology. One aspect of the user’s perception is their trust in the 
system.  A user who thinks the WFMS is capable of less than it actually is may disuse the 
technology – that is, reject the technology and only rely and use it as little as possible. 
We see the results of users disusing technology in the workarounds involving pharmacy 
technicians creating doses prior to interacting with the WFMS. These workarounds 
ranged from drawing the ingredients into the syringe prior to scanning the ingredients to 
creating the entire dose prior (i.e., drawing the ingredients and injecting them into the 
diluent) to interacting (e.g., scanning, taking pictures) with the WFMS. In these cases 
disusing the technology is harmful as it eliminates some of the safety aspects of the 
WFMS – ensuring the correct ingredients are used and a closer representation of the work 
process is relayed to the pharmacist for verification than in the pre-implementation work 
system when the pharmacist had to determine if a dose was properly prepared based 
38 
 
solely on the physical artifacts utilized in the dose preparation process. Conversely, 
misuse is trusting a technology beyond its capabilities. Misuse, like disuse, can have a 
negative impact on how the user interacts with the system.  
 With the implementation of the WFMS several artifacts moved from physical to 
digital, changing the way in which external knowledge, or knowledge in the world, is 
presented. This made it more accessible for the user. It also moved certain knowledge, 
such as the actual quantities of the ingredient to use, from being in the head to being in 
the world. Pre-implementation the knowledge required to create the dose could primarily 
be found in the world and combined with the user’s internal knowledge (i.e., knowledge 
in the head). However, the knowledge in the world was not easily accessible – it was on 
drug inserts (paper inserts from the manufacturer with details on how to properly prepare 
a dose using that particular ingredient), labels and reference sheets created by the 
pharmacist and pharmacy technicians. It was not centrally located and often the 
information found required additional calculations or manipulations before it could be 
used. The inconvenience of locating all of this information incentivized the user to 
internalize some of the external knowledge. For example, a pharmacy technician may be 
more acutely aware of which doses expired quickly or any particularity of using a certain 
ingredient (e.g., requires a filter needle, can only be used with saline, etc.). This is 
because reading the entire ingredient insert or looking at all supplementary guides for 
each dose order is impractical and a nuisance. Once that information was presented 
through electronic artifacts – the WFMS – it was much more easily accessible for the 
user since it was all in one location. The WFMS told the pharmacy technician how to 
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prepare the dose including any special preparations that were needed such as using a filter 
needle. As a result of the ease of accessing this knowledge in the world, the user may no 
longer feel the need to retain the same knowledge in their head (Norman, 2013). This 
means that when the WFMS is bypassed there is an increased risk not only because the 
safety features, such as scanning, are not used but also because the user may not have all 
requisite knowledge in the head.  
 In conclusion, introducing a new technology into a work system can reduce 
certain risks, as shown by the elimination of SVs and reduction of RPN for SVs that 
continued to exist. However, the new technology also opens the work system up to new 
risk, as shown by the introduction of new blocks and there subsequent workarounds and a 
new SV. Nevertheless, in this case the positive impact the WFMS has on safety are 
greater than the potential negative impact and the WFMS implementation is concluded to 
have an overall positive impact. The positive impact of technology, such as the WFMS, 
implementation can be increased by being mindful of the potential risks introduced by the 
implementation of the technology.  
 
Limitations 
As an observational study there was the risk that the Hawthorne Effect impacted 
subject’s behavior during observation. Efforts were made to minimize this (e.g., multiple 
observations, being an impartial observer).  
All observations were done after the WFMS had already been implemented and 
therefore an understanding of the pre-implementation work system was developed 
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through conversations with those who had worked in the pre-implementation work 
system. Observing the pre-implementation work system may have allowed for a deeper 
understanding of certain aspects and may have led to observing aspects that the users did 
not mention in our discussions. Therefore, future research should consider observing the 
pre-implementation work system.  
All observations and coding were done by one person. Consequently there is the 
risk of bias. Efforts were made to minimize any user bias by consulting with others on the 
list of system vulnerabilities, workarounds and observations.  
 
Impacts and Implications 
 The categorization structures used in this research can be utilized in future 
engineering needs assessments which analyze potential technology’s integration into 
work systems. Both the identification of SVs and workarounds and the manner in which 
the SVs and workarounds were examined is unique.  
 While this research examined the implementation of a WFMS in a pharmaceutical 
environment, the outcomes can be generalized to the implementation of other types of 
technologies in other areas. Technology, already prevalent in several aspects of our lives, 
is becoming more and more prevalent in new ways and in new areas. A few examples 
include small business owners transforming phones and tablets into cash registers, 
automobiles offering increased automation for driving tasks that were once manual or 
only partially automated, or the incorporation of web-based learning into our educational 
experience. All of these technologies offer benefits – the convenience of having point of 
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service software without having to make the expensive upfront investment, making the 
driving experience more comfortable, efficient, and safe for drivers, and increased 
learning time without increasing the work load on instructors. However, there may be 
unintended consequences or inconveniences to implementing these technologies – having 
to sign a screen instead of a paper receipt may alienate some customers, the loss of the 
ability to do the driving tasks manually, or connectivity issues causing students to miss 
out on assignments and causing additional hassle for instructors. Consequently, it is 
important that technology and its impact on the work system is understood. The 
methodology used in this study can be applied to areas such as those previously given 
and help develop the necessary understanding. The analysis methodology and framework 
of this analysis can be applied to areas where technology continues to play an 
increasingly important role.  
 As a qualitative study, this research also fills a gap in the medication error 
research which has primarily focused on a quantitative analysis of specific outcomes 
(e.g., error reduction) following the implementation of a specific technology (Bates et al., 
1998; Eslami et al., 2006; Moniz et al., 2014; Nebeker et al., 2005). Also, unlike previous 
research, this research focuses on potential errors or situations which may give rise to 
errors. The framework of this study allows the examination of a work system prior to an 
error which can help prevent the error from occurring rather than relying on the 
occurrence and detection of an error to assess the system.  
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Future Research 
 This research developed a new methodology of categorizing SVs and 
workarounds which provides a new way in which to analyze a work system. This 
research applied this methodology to a pharmaceutical environment where a WFMS was 
recently implemented. The methodology allows for a proactive identification of problem 
areas which allows for analysis prior to a safety event occurring.  
This methodology is applicable to other areas of healthcare, such as electronic 
health records (EHR), as well as in other domains such as manufacturing. Further 
research will utilize this methodology in other domains as well as with different 
technologies in order to evaluate how it works in other domains. Additionally, future 
research will, if possible, observe the work system prior to the implementation of the 
technology as well as following implementation.  
Through further research it will be possible to evaluate how SVs and workarounds 
translate into engineering user needs assessments for iterative design cycles. By utilizing 
the methodology used in this research in other domains, the role of SVs and workarounds 
in a variety of domains will be better understood. This will allow for the SVs and 
workarounds, and the benefits from identifying them prior to implementation, to be 
utilized to better identify the needs of the user. This can result in a better implementation 
process.  
 Further research should also evaluate how this methodology of identifying SVs 
and workarounds can fit into the design cycle for future technologies. Similar to utilizing 
SV and workaround identification to better understand the user needs, identifying how 
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this methodology can be utilized in the design of future technologies is necessary. It 
should be evaluated, in a variety of domains, how this methodology can assist with 
developing a better design of technology.  
 Additionally, there is room for future research in how users adapt to technology. 
Identifying workarounds is the beginning of identifying how users adapt to technology, 
and there is the opportunity for additional research in this field such as identifying the 
role complacency plays in the user-technology interaction. 
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